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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Respondent Board of Commissioners of Gem County (the "County" or "Board")
attempts to recast this case as one about St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. ("St. Luke's") and to
paint St. Luke's as a bad actor. However, not only is this attempt completely contradicted by and
unsupported in the factual record before the Court, it is also directly contrary to the County's
position in the hearing before the Board and any findings by the Board initially or after remand.
The absence of any citations to the record in the process of making such allegations is telling.
Indeed, the County's attorney acknowledged at the underlying hearing before the Board that
St. Luke's acted appropriately: "I don't think anybody in this room is saying, hey, they
[St. Luke's] didn't ... do what they should have done."). ATr., p. 20, 11. 4-6.
More importantly, this case is not principally about St. Luke's. It is about an indigent
Gem County resident (the "Patient") who suffered a life threatening medical emergency and
whether the Medical Indigency Act, Idaho Code section 31-3501, et seq. (the "Act"), obligates
the County to accept responsibility for its resident's necessary medical services. Indeed, the only
issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation and whether the Act requires that services
must be actually available to the Patient before those services can be considered in determining
what services "are the most cost-effective services or sequence of services" and therefore
"necessary medical services" under the Act.
From a global perspective, providing quality medical treatment at available facilities in
the most cost-effective setting to indigent residents of Idaho is a legitimate aim that is not always
realized and is deserving of continual efforts. Here, no facility would accept transfer of this
Patient from St. Luke's. Under the Act, counties in Idaho have been given responsibility to pay
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for necessary medical care to indigent residents. Counties have also been provided legislative
tools to contract with providers and facilitate transfers of patients to help increase the availability
and willingness of less acute facilities to provide care. The record does not reflect that the
County has any contracts with any provider to help prevent instances like the one at hand, which
is not surprising given its position. The County's solution to this issue is to have the facility who
provided the required acute level of care continue to provide the necessary lower level of care
without reimbursement, or, as was the case here, require the treating facility to contract with a
lower level facility and pay for the care. This "solution" runs directly counter to the express
language and purpose of the Act.
Despite the plain language and clear purpose of the Act, the County attempts to shift the
statutory burden of financial responsibility of indigent patients onto medical providers. Further,
the County has interpreted the Act as requiring it to deny the Patient assistance because it is
bound by Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion that the Patient could have theoretically (but not
actually) been transferred to a lower cost facility at a certain point. But the County ignores that
there is a difference between what services are clinically necessary from a purely medical
standpoint and what services are legally "necessary medical services" as defined under the Act.
The former is appropriately decided by a medical professional, but the latter, the legal
interpretation of a statutory definition, is not. Nonetheless, the County argues that it is bound by
Dr. Dammrose' s clinical opinion and that Idaho law does not require it to consider whether
services are actually available to the Patient when determining whether the services provided
were the most cost-effective under Idaho Code section 31-3502(1 S)A(e).
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It is the purview of this Court to interpret Idaho law. The plain language of the Act, this

Court's existing precedent, and to avoid absurd results contrary to the purpose of the Act require
that the availability of alternative treatment for the Patient must be considered when comparing
whether the services provided were the most cost-effective under section 31-3502(1 S)A( e) .
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As noted in St. Luke's opening brief, the underlying facts of this case are undisputed.
However, the County makes certain allusions, and in some cases direct statements, that are
incompatible with the facts of the case and find no foundation in the record. St. Luke's rebuts
those assertions below.
A.

Response to Respondent's Statement of Facts.

The County asserts that at the appeal hearing before the Board, one of the Commissioners
asked St. Luke's whether the care offered from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, was billed
by St. Luke's at the higher care rate. Resp't Br. at 3. The County then states that "[t]he hospital
admitted that there was less care provided but did not offer a reduced rate." Id. This statement
of fact by the County is a misstatement. Indeed, the exchange cited to by the County actually
reveals the opposite:
Comm. Elliott: Yeah. I just have a question of interest. So during
the 20 days that [the Patient] did not need the higher rate of care,
was that care still administered at that rate and was it billed at that
rate?
Mr. Peterson: It was still at a - the care was - I mean there was
less care provided in terms of the acuteness of the care ... but [the
Patient] was intubated for a large part of it and so she was in the
ICU and the care was much more extensive. Absolutely....
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Mr. Peterson: So, to answer your question, certainly the
charges were less than prior[.]
ATr., p. 17, 1. 6 - p. 18, 1. 3 (emphasis added).
The Commissioner then goes on to acknowledge that the care provided during the dates
in question was provided at a lower charged amount than when the Patient was in the ICU and
queries whether the amount charged by St. Luke's was "close to matching" the amount that
would have been charged by an alternate facility.

Id., p. 18, 11. 4-5.

St. Luke's counsel

responded that he was unfamiliar with the other facility's charges but acknowledged that it was a
lower level facility than St. Luke's. Id., p. 18, 11. 6-22. St. Luke's, as it did before the Board,
acknowledges, as an acute care hospital, that the cost of care it provided the Patient likely cost
more than the care the Patient would have received at a lower cost facility if such a facility
would have been available to the Patient. However, an acknowledgment that an acute care
hospital like St. Luke's is more costly than a rehabilitation facility is markedly different from the
County's assertion that St. Luke's did not lower the charges. The record expressly shows the
charges were substantially less when the Patient's care became less intensive. See ATr., p. 17,
1. 6 - p. 18, 1. 3; see also App. Op. Br. at 4 n.3.
The County also alludes throughout its brief that St. Luke's "decided" to "keep" the
Patient at its facilities. In particular, the County asserts that placement at Life Care "could have
been, and in fact should have been, entered into in February. A lower level of care could have
been achieved much sooner and much more cost effectively as reiterated by Dr. Dammrose."
Resp't Br. at 7-8. The County further asserts that "St. Luke's seeks to be paid for their decision
not to transfer the Patient to a lower level of care at the time that it was appropriate." Id. at 11.
The suggestion from these statements is that St. Luke's somehow made a deliberate decision to
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retain the Patient out of some sort of financial motivation or incompetence. Such an assertion is
patently false and is unsupported by the factual record.

Notably, the County provides no

citations to the record for these incorrect factual assertions nor is there any support in either of
the findings by the Board.
It is important to note that there is no dispute that the Patient could not be discharged

home. See Tr., p. 26, 11. 22-25 ("Both parties agree the [Patient] ... could not have been simply
discharged home."). Further, the record clearly shows that St. Luke's made extensive efforts to
place the Patient in a lower cost facility as soon as possible. App. Op. Br. at 3-7; AR at 319.
The reality is that the only facility willing to provide the ongoing care to the Patient was
St. Luke's. Id.

Additionally, at no point did Dr. Dammrose opine that there was a facility

willing to provide the lower level of care noted in his report or that St. Luke's was less than
diligent in its efforts.

Dr. Dammrose gave a medical opinion about when the Patient was

clinically stable enough to be transferred to a lower level of care generally. He did not opine that
there was such a facility willing to accept transfer of the uninsured Patient and provide the
ongoing care that the Patient still needed. AR at 27--42.
Finally, and most importantly, the only evidence in the record is that while St. Luke's
made multiple efforts to transfer the Patient, there were simply no lower cost facilities willing to
accept the Patient, due primarily to the lack of any confirmed health insurance or other funding
source. See App. Op. Br. at 3-7; AR at 316, 319-20. This is a fact not disputed by the Board in
its findings.

AR at 4 78-80.

This is also a fact acknowledged, and undisputed, by

Dr. Dammrose: "Due to her lack of insurance she was said to have no viable option for care."
AR at 40. Thus, despite the County's unfounded allusions to the contrary, St. Luke's did not
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"decide to keep" this uninsured Patient at its facilities in lieu of transferring her to a lower cost
provider. Rather, the facts clearly demonstrate that St. Luke's attempted to transfer the Patient as
soon as possible and even went as far as to pay for the Patient's care at a different provider in
order to facilitate the transfer. Any assertion or allusion that St. Luke's made a "decision to
keep" the Patient beyond February 19, 2016, or that the Patient "could have been" transferred
before March 9, 2016, is wholly unsupported by the facts in the record and is not a finding of
fact that was made by the Board.
III.

ARGUMENT

The only question before the Court is whether services at a lower cost facility must be
actually available to a patient before they can be considered and compared in determining
whether the services provided to a patient "are the most cost-effective" under Idaho Code
section 31-3502(1 S)A(e). The County argues that the actual availability of services at a facility
willing to provide the care has no impact on whether the services provided to a patient "are the
most cost-effective" services available. Further, the County argues that if actual availability is
considered, there would be no limitation on what services hospitals could be compensated for.
For the reasons discussed below, both of these arguments fail.
A.

The Board Did Not Correctly Apply Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) and
Therefore Acted in Violation of Statutory Provisions and Exceeded Its
Statutory Authority.

In arguing that the Board correctly applied Idaho Code section 31-3502(18), the County
asserts three basic points: (1) the language of the statute does not require the County to consider
actual availability of care at a facility, and it is not the County's responsibility to provide
alternative care; (2) the County is bound by what Dr. Dammrose opines; and (3) the Court should
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not consider a case that interpreted a subsection of the same statute at issue here. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court should reject these arguments.
1.

The language of Section 31-3502(18)A(e) clearly requires that only those
services at a facility that are actually available to a patient be considered
when determining medical necessity.

The entirety of the County's argument in this regard is summarized by the County's
statement: "If the legislature wanted to require the County to consider whether alternative service
options are actually available to the hospital ... they could have put that in the statute. They did
not." Resp't Br. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). But the legislature did put it in the statute.
Idaho Code section 31-3502(1 S)A( e) requires that the services rendered "are the most costeffective service or sequence of services[.]"

LC. § 31-3502(18)(e) (emphasis added).

As

detailed in St. Luke's Opening Brief, the use of the affirmative present-tense verb "are" clearly
indicates a requirement that the services considered must be those actually and presently
available to the patient. See App. Op. Br. at 12-18. Further, the use of the adjective "most"
clearly invites a comparison between available services-comparing theoretical or unavailable
services is a useless act. Id. at 16. The County offers no rebuttal to these arguments. Further,
even if the use of the affirmative present tense verb "are" was ambiguous, the statute should be
interpreted to require that the services considered are actually available to the patient in order to
serve the clearly stated policy of the Act. See id. at 13-19. The County offers no rebuttal to this
argument either.
Instead, the County attempts to divert the Court's attention by making the unfounded
assertion that the Patient could have been transferred "much sooner and much more cost
effectively." Resp't Br. at 10. There is absolutely no factual support in the record for this
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assertion, which is likely why the County cites to none. The uncontroverted facts show that
although Dr. Dammrose noted that a lower level of care was clinically appropriate, no lower
level care facilities were available to the Patient during the dates in question and only became
available when St. Luke's convinced a facility to accept the Patient based upon St. Luke's
voluntarily agreeing to pay for the Patient's treatment. See App. Op. Br. at 3-7.
The County argues that it was St. Luke's responsibility to "seek out arrangements" for
the care of the indigent Patient and that failing that, the costs of the care "would also fall upon
the patient or applicant." Resp't Br. at 10. But St. Luke's was under no statutory obligation to
agree to pay for the Patient's treatment at another facility. Nowhere in the Act is a provider
required to pay for the necessary medical services of indigent patients. See LC. § 31-3501, et
seq. Indeed, the stated purpose of the Act is to "provide indigents with access to medical care
and to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah
Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (quoting Carpenter v. Twin
Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 582, 691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984)). By statute, the cost of providing
necessary medical services to indigent patients falls on the counties, not on the providers or the
indigent patient as suggested by the County. LC. § 31-3501 (noting that one of the purposes of
the Act is to "provide for the payment" of medical services provided to the indigent); LC.
§ 31-3503(1) ("The county commissioners ... shall ... pay for necessary medical services for
the medically indigent[.]").
The County tries to avoid this inevitable conclusion by pointing to the district court's
reasoning. Resp't Br. at 10-11. However, the district court's reasoning suffers from the same
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flaw-it places the burden of securing care for indigent patients on the providers when the Act
clearly places it on the counties. The district court stated:
Nothing in the statute requires the county to investigate or
determine for itself the specific availability of alternative services
to a specific patient. Rather, the burden is on the patient or the
applicant to show all elements of eligibility, including the absence
of appropriate alternative providers or services where that is an
issue.
In this case, the inference was that suitable facilities did
exist, for St. Luke's itself acknowledged this in reporting that it
was unable to get one of these facilities to accept the patient
without a financial guarantee. Further, St. Luke's also
demonstrated that the problem could be solved without county
assistance because the hospital solved it.
CR at 183-84. The district court then found:
This Court concludes that the county was correct in its
determination that the issue of availability of alternative providers
includes only the determination that such facilities actually exist,
have beds or openings available, and do provide that appropriate
level of care necessary to the patient's situation. The issue does
not include the specific issue of non-acceptance of the patient
based upon financial considerations.
CR at 186.
The first paragraph of the district court's reasoning is largely correct in that it places the
initial burden on the patient to demonstrate indigency. However, once the initial showing of
indigency is met, "the burden of proof shifts to the board to rebut the applicant's claims."
Salinas v. Canyon Cnty., 117 Idaho 218, 221 (Ct. App. 1990).

Here, St. Luke's presented

evidence that there were no other facilities willing to accept transfer of the Patient before March
9, 2016. See App. Op. Br. at 3-4. The County has never rebutted this evidence. Nowhere does
the County, Dr. Dammrose, or even the district court point to any other facility that was actually
willing or able to treat the Patient from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016. Instead, the district
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court, and now the County, takes the position that the County only has to determine that "such
facilities actually exist, have beds or openings available, and do provide that appropriate level of
care necessary to the patient's situation," CR at 186, and that the financial ability of the patient to
secure placement at such a facility (i.e., whether the patient can actually be treated there) is not a
factor in determining whether the facility is available to the patient.
But this position ignores the reality of medical indigency cases and the purpose of the
Act. First, the idea that financial ability is not a factor contemplated by the Act in determining
whether a service is available to a patient is simply untenable. The entire purpose of the Act is to
provide assistance to indigent patients-by definition, indigent patients are without the financial
means to pay for their necessary medical care.

To remove financial consideration from the

equation obviates the entire purpose of the Act. If the patient had the financial means to obtain
the care, the Act would not even apply. Second, doing so would place the financial burden of
providing care to indigent patients on the providers, which, as noted above, runs explicitly
contrary to the purpose of the Act.

Ultimately, the County's argument (echoed by the district court) is that it should not bear
the burden of managing the costs of an indigent patient's care; that the provider, not the County,
is responsible for contracting with other providers to ensure that the services being provided are
the most cost-effective and that the provider (or the indigent patient) is responsible for solving
any financial problems (by the provider paying) in securing such care. See Resp 't Br. at 10-11.
But, as noted above, such an argument ignores part of the clear purpose of the Act, which is for
providers "to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents," not for providers to be
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unreimbursed for care it provides or contract and pay for services for indigent patients at other
facilities. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 143 at 810, 153 P.3d at 1156 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Act explicitly provides that the counties, not the providers, are responsible
for managing the costs of an indigent patient's care and provides the tools for the county to do
so. Under Idaho Code section 31-3503, the county commissioners:
Have the right to contract with providers, transfer patients,
negotiate provider agreements, conduct utilization management or
any portion thereof . . . that would assist in managing costs of
providing health care for indigent persons [.]
LC. § 31-3503(2) .
By statute, it is the counties, not providers treating indigent residents, who are tasked
with contracting with providers, transferring patients, and conducting utilization management to
manage costs. Indeed, utilization management is defined under the Act as, among other things,
"continued stay review, discharge planning, [and] case management."

LC. § 31-3502(28)

(emphasis added). Thus, by statute, the very thing that the County claims St. Luke's should have
done "sooner" (i.e., case management and arranging for a transfer) actually falls under the
purview of the County, not St. Luke's.

That is not to say that St. Luke's does not play a

significant role in trying to transfer patients to less acute facilities when appropriate. St. Luke's
did exactly that in trying to find a facility that would accept the transfer of the Patient with no
ability to pay for the care. See App. Op. Br. at 3-7 (outlining efforts by St. Luke's to place the
Patient with other providers).
St. Luke's duty as a health care provider is to provide medical care to everyone who
walks through their doors that it has the ability to treat. It does so in the most effective and cost
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efficient manner it can.

1

However, in this particular case, as noted by Dr. Dammrose, although

the patient was clinically ready for discharge from St. Luke's on February 19, 2016, there was no
other facility willing to take the Patient on that date. Dr. Dammrose readily acknowledges this,
noting that the Patient had been rejected at other facilities due to a lack of funding. AR 40 ("Due
to her lack of insurance she was said to have no viable option for care.").
Yet, despite the clear efforts made by St. Luke's to place the Patient in another facility,
the County, without any citations to any state or federal statutes, regulations, or the record, and
without any evidence to support its conclusion, summarily states that St. Luke's somehow should
have begun its efforts sooner and suggests that St. Luke's should have agreed to pay for the
Patient's stay earlier.
To be clear, the Act places no obligation on St. Luke's to contract with or pay for care at
other facilities for indigent patients. St. Luke's obligation is to provide necessary medical care;
it is not required by the Act to pay for the transfer of indigent patients to outpatient or
rehabilitation facilities. Indeed, as noted above, the Act clearly places that obligation on the
County.

2

LC.§ 31-3503(2). In fact, the Act explicitly grants the County (and the CAT Board),

not St. Luke's, "the right to have an approved indigent resident transferred to a ... facility." LC.
§ 31-3507. Thus, the County's position (and the district court's position) that it was somehow
incumbent upon St. Luke's to "solve the problem" by contracting sooner (or even at all) to

1

See supra pp. 2-3 (explaining that St. Luke's charged less as the Patient's needs lessened);
App. Op. Br. at 4 n.3 (same).
2
Notably, the CAT Board has the same power and duty as the County to contract with
providers, transfer patients, and conduct utilization management, including case management.
See LC. § 31-3503A(2) .
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arrange transfer of the indigent Patient by paying for said costs is simply not supported by the
Act.
The County cannot escape its statutory responsibility to pay for necessary medical
services incurred by its indigent resident by claiming that because certain services at a more costeffective facility were theoretically (but not actually) available to the Patient, the services
rendered by St. Luke's were not the most cost-effective. To do so not only defies logic (by
default, the only services available are the most cost-effective), but also defies the plain
language of the Act and places the statutory burden clearly intended for the County onto the
providers and indigent patients.

The County's argument that St. Luke's was somehow

responsible for ensuring that the Patient's medical services were paid for is contrary to the clear
language and policy of the Act.
2.

The Board is not required to follow Dr. Dammrose's legal opinion and, in
any event, Dr. Dammrose did not opine on the availability of lower cost
services.

It is notable that the County fails to rebut St. Luke's argument that the Board's decision

was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Instead, the County attempts to escape
liability for payment of the Patient's medical services by arguing that the Board cannot approve
payment for "any service that utilization management has determined to be 'not medically
necessary."' Resp't Br. at 12.

In essence, the County argues that, because Dr. Dammrose

provided a clinical opinion that the Patient was suitable for a lower level of care as of
February 19, 2016, the County was bound by Dr. Dammrose's opinion and could not authorize
payment for the dates in question. Id. at 11-12. In support of this argument, the County cites
Idaho Code section 31-3505B. Id.
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However, Idaho Code section 31-3505B clearly states that the determination of necessary
medical services rests with the County. Section 31-3505B states: "The county commissioners
shall approve an application ...

if it [i.e., the County] determines that necessary medical

services have been or will be provided to medically indigent resident[.]" (Emphasis added). The
statute clearly states that the County is responsible for making a determination of medical
necessity. It does not say an application shall be approved or denied based on the medical
advisor's medical opinion regarding the legal/statutory definition of necessary medical services.
That the Board, not the medical advisor, is responsible for making legal findings and conclusions
regarding the legal meaning of necessary medical services is further buttressed by the fact that it
is the County that is responsible for ruling on applications, not the medical advisor. See I.C.
§ 31-3505C ("[T]he county commissioners shall make an initial determination to approve or
deny an application .... " (emphasis added)). Indeed, the decision of this Court on the initial
appeal was to remand the matter to the Board such that the Board could provide a reasoned
analysis outlining the basis for its opinion. If the Board's role under the statute is limited to only
repeating the interpretation of the statute posited by the reviewing physician, then there would be
no reason to require the Board to issue more detailed findings.
Moreover, Idaho Code section 31-3505F explicitly provides: "In the event that a county

determines that service is not a necessary medical service, a provider may submit the issue to a
panel for arbitration [.]" (Emphasis added). This is a clear statement that the Board, not the
medical advisor, is to make the determination of whether a service is a necessary medical
service.

Section 3 l-3505F continues by outlining the arbitration processes, which includes

review of the County's determination of medical necessity by three qualified medical
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professionals, and states: "No party shall be obligated to comply with or otherwise be affected or
prejudiced by the proposals, conclusions or suggestions of the panel ... however in the interest
of due consideration being given to such proceedings ... the applicable statute of limitations
shall be tolled" while the claim being arbitrated and for thirty (30) days after. LC. § 31-3505F(2)
(emphasis added). This statement by the legislature makes it clear that a county can give "due
consideration" to a decision by the panel despite any prior medical advisor opinion. Put another
way, if the County was bound to follow the medical advisor's opinion, there would be no need
for the legislature to provide for an arbitration process or for the County to give "due
consideration" to any decision by the panel because the County would already be strictly bound
by the medical advisor's opinion.
The County's argument that the Board does not have the ability to make findings and
draw conclusions regarding whether a service or sequence of services met the legal definition of
necessary medical services independent of its medical advisor's clinical opinion is simply
unsupported by the relevant authority. It should go without saying that Dr. Dammrose is not a
legal expert and his interpretation of the Act is not binding on the Board.
Furthermore, Dr. Dammrose did not say that services at a lower level facility were
actually available to the Patient. Indeed, he did not dispute that the Patient's lack of insurance
created no viable alternative facility option. AR at 40. He noted that various facilities declined
to accept transfer of the Patient. AR at 39--41. Dr. Dammrose only offered his clinical opinion
that services at an acute care hospital like St. Luke's, from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016,
were not necessary from a clinical standpoint and that care at a lower level facility would have
been clinically appropriate. Id.

Specifically, he determined that "the patient was medically
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stable on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care hospital," and
"[h]er medical care was at maintenance level, and her needs were rehabilitative in nature." Id. at
41. St. Luke's does not dispute those clinical opinions. Missing, however, is any suggestion that
a lower cost facility was willing to accept transfer of the Patient. See AR at 39-41. The County
has not pointed to any evidence that there was a lower level provider actually capable and willing
to accept transfer of the Patient before March 9, 2016. See App. Op. Br. at 7. This is because it
is undisputed that care at a lower level facility was not available to the Patient. See id. at 3-7.
Ultimately, while St. Luke's does not dispute Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion that the
Patient was medically stable by February 19, 2016, St. Luke's does dispute the notion that the
Board is bound by any legal interpretation or conclusion reached by Dr. Dammrose regarding
what services are "necessary medical services" as defined under the Act. Dr. Dammrose is not
authorized to draw legal conclusions regarding the Act, and the County cannot shirk its
responsibility to determine medical necessity by arguing that it is absolved from making findings
and conclusions regarding whether a service or sequence of services meets the statutory
definition of necessary medical service just because Dr. Dammrose said it does not.

3

The Board cannot abdicate its role under the Act in favor of Dr. Dammrose's
unsupported and mistaken legal opinion about what services constitute "necessary medical
services." Accordingly, to the extent the County is arguing that the Board did just that, the
Board violated its statutory duty to determine whether the services rendered by St. Luke's were
3

Although certainly not binding on the Court, a relatively recent case in Twin Falls County
confronted a similar issue. See In re Med. Indigency Application of MS., Twin Falls Cnty. Case
No. CV42-15-2357 (Dec. 14, 2015), provided in the Record at CR at 87-102. In that case, the
district court held that it was error for the county to rely on Dr. Dammrose's legal opinion
incorrectly interpreting the statutory definition of "emergency services." CR at 97-101. This
case warrants the same result.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 16
40914.0131.13160363.3

necessary medical services under the Act. By doing so, the Board also abused its discretion by
failing to act within the bounds of its discretion and by failing to act consistently with the legal
standards regarding its duty to determine whether services meet the legal definition of necessary
medical services under the Act. See App. Op. Br. 29-32. As such, the Board's decision denying
assistance to the Patient for the dates in question should be reversed under Idaho Code
sections 67-5279(3)( a), (e).
3.

St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County is factually on point
and should be considered by the Court.

The County only dedicates one paragraph in an attempt to distinguish the current case
from the facts of St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County, 134 Idaho 486, 5
P.3d 466 (2000). See Resp't Br. at 12-13. This is likely because the County recognizes that
there is no way to convincingly distinguish the two cases.

The County's only attempt at

distinguishing the two cases is to state: "This case can be distinguished from the facts in our case
because the court used this analysis in determining an applicant's eligibility for assistance, not
whether resources were available to the hospital." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). Although
somewhat unclear, it appears the County is attempting to distinguish St. Joseph on the premise
that the issue in St. Joseph dealt with the availability of resources to the patient rather than
resources available to a hospital. This argument, however, is fatally flawed because the question
at hand is not whether there was a facility willing to provide a lower level of care to St. Luke's
(St. Luke's was not in need of care) but, rather, whether there was care at a lower level facility
available to the Patient. Thus, despite the County's assertion otherwise, the focus of the current
case is exactly the same as in St. Joseph-can the County deny assistance on the premise that
certain resources or services are theoretically, but not actually, available to the Patient?
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As detailed in St. Luke's opening brief, St. Joseph answered this question in the negative.
App. Opp. Br. at 27-29. Specifically, the court held in St. Joseph that in order to be considered
by the county for purposes of determining eligibility under the Medical Indigency Statutes, the
other treatment options must be actually available to the patient. 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P .3d at
470. The court then further held that because there was no evidence in the record that any of the
services alleged as available to the patient were actually available, the evidence did not support
the county's denial of the patient's application. Id.
There is no credible distinction between St. Joseph and the current case. The County
alleges that assistance should be denied because care at a lower cost facility was clinically
appropriate for the Patient. However, the only evidence in the record is that there were no lower
cost facilities actually available and willing to accept the Patient. See App. Op. Br. at 3-7. The
only services available to the Patient for the dates in question were the services provided by
St. Luke's. Id. Indeed, the County does not even attempt to identify or otherwise argue that
there were services at a lower cost facility actually available, it simply asserts that availability of
the services should have no bearing on the Board's determination of eligibility. St. Joseph,
however, clearly rebuts this argument-availability of services to the patient must be considered
by the board in making its determination. St. Joseph, 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P.3d at 470.
Accordingly, because the evidence in the record is that St. Luke's was the only facility
willing to provide care to the Patient (no lower level facility was willing to accept a transfer), the
Court should follow St. Joseph and hold that the Board's decision to deny payment for services
for the dates in question was not supported by the evidence and, thereby, reverse the Board's
decision.
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B.

The County's Remaining Arguments Regarding the Plain Language and
Purpose of the Act Are Red Herrings.

The County includes a section in its brief entitled, "St. Luke's Analysis of the Statute's
Plain Language and Purpose is Erroneous." Resp't Br. at 13. However, as noted above, the
County fails to address the arguments made by St. Luke's in its opening brief. Specifically, the
County does not respond to St. Luke's analysis of the use of the present-tense affirmative verb
"are"; fails to argue why the use of the adjective "most" does not invite a comparison between
available services; and omits any attempt to rebut St. Luke's arguments regarding construction of
the statute as a whole or legislative intent. See App. Op. Br. at 12-21. The County also fails to
address the fact that under the EMTLA, St. Luke's legally could not transfer the Patient without
there being a facility willing to accept the Patient. See id at 19-20. Further, the County does not
address the fact that it is the counties, not the providers, who are provided the statutory authority
to "contract with providers, transfer patients, [and] negotiate provider agreements." Id. at 22
(quoting I.C. §§ 31-3503(2); 3 l-3502A(2)).
Rather than respond to the arguments made by St. Luke's, the County introduces a red
herring regarding skilled nursing facilities to distract the Court. In short, the County attempts to
suggest that because Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)B(d) states that "[s]ervices related to, or
provided by . . . skilled nursing facilities" are not considered necessary medical services, the
services provided by St. Luke's for the dates in question should be denied. See Resp't Br. at 9,
13. However, this argument, like the County's argument regarding the availability of services,
relies on a hypothetical or theoretical scenario where the services provided to the Patient during
the dates in question were provided by or related to a skilled nursing facility. The reality is that
the services provided to the Patient during the dates in question were provided by St. Luke's,
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which is an acute care hospital, not a skilled nursing facility. Further, the services that were
provided after the Patient left St. Luke's were provided at a subacute rehabilitation center, not a
skilled nursing facility. See AR 40 (noting that "a subacute rehab Life Care of Treasure Valley
[] has accepted the patient").

Arguing that the services could have, or should have, been

provided by a skilled nursing facility is simply an attempt to sidestep the reality that the services
could not have been-and in fact were not-provided by a skilled nursing facility.
Moreover, there is simply no evidence that a skilled nursing facility would have been
sufficient for the Patient during the dates of service in question. The Board makes no such
finding, and Dr. Dammrose only opines that the Patient "no longer needed the services of an
acute care inpatient hospital." AR at 41. He does not state the services of a skilled nursing
facility would have met the Patient's needs. For example, the services of a long-term acute care
hospital, rehabilitation hospital, or other lower care facilities may have been more appropriate
during the dates in question. Indeed, Dr. Dammrose says the Patient's care during these dates
was "rehabilitative" in nature, and the Patient was, in fact, placed in a rehabilitative center. AR
at 41.

4

The fact is, there simply is no finding by the Board that the Patient's needs could have

been met by a skilled nursing facility, and there is no evidence to support such an assertion. As
such, even assuming Section 31-3502(18)B(d) somehow applied to St. Luke's (it does not
because St. Luke's is not a skilled nursing facility), there is no evidence in the record to

4

See also Respondent's Brief at 2, noting that the Patient was discharged to "Life Care
Center, a rehabilitation center," and page 10, noting placement of the Patient at "Life Care of
Boise, a rehabilitative hospital." (Emphases added.)
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demonstrate that the services required by and actually provided to the Patient were services that
were provided by or related to a skilled nursing facility.

5

Finally, the County appears to respond to St. Luke's absurd results argument by arguing
that requiring the Board to consider the availability of services in making determinations
regarding the cost effectiveness of necessary medical services would result in hospitals being
"paid to any end."

Resp't Br. at 14.

In support of this argument, the County provides a

hypothetical scenario in which a "hospital could find that no one at a patient's home was
available to assist with discharge and hold the patient at the acute care rate for a period of days."
Id. Not only is this hypothetical scenario inconsistent with the facts of this case where there is

no dispute that the Patient could not have been discharged home, it is statutorily impossible.
If the hypothetical patient was appropriate to be discharged home and the hospital refused

or decided not to do so, holding the patient for additional days would be "primarily for the
convenience of the person, physician or other health care provider," and would not be a
necessary medical service. See LC. § 31-3502(18)A(d). Similarly, in this case, if treatment at a
lower cost facility was appropriate and actually available to the Patient, treatment at St. Luke's
would not be a necessary medical service because it would not be the most cost-effective service
available to the Patient. See LC. § 31-3502(18)A(e). Thus, despite the County's hyperbolic

5

It is important to note that although skilled nursing facilities are explicitly excluded from
the definition of necessary medical services under the Act, rehabilitation hospitals or care are not
included in the list of excluded services. See LC. 3 l-3502(18)B(d). Under the maxim expression
unius est exclusion alterius, this would mean that rehabilitation services are necessary medical
services. See KGF Dev., LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 528, 236 P.3d 1284, 1288
(2010) ("It is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a constitution or
statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others.").
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assertion and attempt to catastrophize, requiring services to be actually available to the Patient
would not result in compensation to hospitals "without limitation."
In sum, the facts of this case, rather than baseless hypothetical scenarios, are clear. The
services provided to the Patient during the dates in question were not provided by or related to a
skilled nursing facility; they were provided by St. Luke's, an acute care hospital, and the services
rendered were rehabilitative in nature. Further, there is no question that the Patient in this case
could not simply be discharged to home and that treatment at a lower cost facility was not
actually available to the Patient for the dates in question. See App. Op. Br. at 3-7. Accordingly,
as the only services actually available to the Patient, the services rendered by St. Luke's were the
most cost effective services and, therefore, were necessary medical services under the Act. This
does not mean, however, that there are no limitations whatsoever on what services are
compensable under the Medical Indigency Statutes.

Only those services that are medically

necessary and "are the most cost-effective" are compensable. Requiring actual availability of
the services in assessing which services "are the most cost-effective" does not remove that
limitation.
C.

The Second Final Order Fails to Comply with the APA.

The County argues that the Second Final Order, AR 475-77, meets the m1mmum
standards of the AP A. Resp 't Br. at 15-16. But nowhere in the Second Final Order does the
Board set out why the dates of service from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, failed to meet
the legal definition of necessary medical services. The Board simply points to Dr. Dammrose's
medical opinion and states: "The medical opinion of Dr. Dammrose is that dates of service
02/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary medical services defined in the statute." AR at
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4 77 (emphasis added). The Board apparently concluded, with no discussion of the statute at
issue or the fact that there was no lower cost facility willing to accept the Patient, that
Dr. Dammrose' s medical opinion was sufficient to meet the legal definition of necessary medical
services under the Act. However, it is impossible to tell for certain that is what the Board's
reasoning was because the Board provides no reasoning beyond this statement.
The Board also states that the patient was medically ready for discharge as of
February 19, 2016, and that "[t]here was no contrary evidence presented and St. Luke's
argument does not contradict the medical evidence." Id. However, it is unclear what evidence
the Board is referring to with its statement.

If the Board is referring to medical evidence

regarding whether the Patient was suitable for discharge from an acute inpatient hospital, then
the Board's statement makes sense. St. Luke's does not and did not contradict Dr. Dammrose's
medical opinion that the Patient was medically ready for discharge from St. Luke's on February
19, 2016. However, if the Board's statement regarding a lack of evidence refers to whether the
services provided by St. Luke's from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, met the legal
definition of necessary medical services, then the Board's statement does not make sense
because St. Luke's provided argument and substantial unrebutted evidence that no other facilities
were available to the patient before March 9, 2016. App. Op. Br. at 3-7; AR at 316-28; ATr.,
pp. 8-11.
The County asserts that the Board was "not asked to consider whether a lower cost
facility was willing to accept the patient for dates of service between February 19, 2016 and
March 9, 2016." Resp't Br. at 16. However, that was the entirety of St. Luke's position before
the Board: "And the hospital's position is there may have been - - from a clinical standpoint, a
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lower level of care may have been appropriate but because there was no facility that was
available ... those dates of service were appropriate and medically necessary[.]" ATr., pp. 1113; p. 13, 1. 25 - p. 14, 1. 5. Indeed, the fundamental issue in this case is whether, under the Act,
services must be actually available to a patient before those services can be considered in
determining what services "are the most cost-effective services or sequence of services" and
therefore "necessary medical services" under the Act. The Board not only fails to address this
question in its Second Final Order, the County states that it was not required to.
Ultimately, aside from the Board stating that Dr. Dammrose said so, there is simply no
language in the Second Final Order that addresses why the Board determined that the services
failed to meet the legal definition of necessary medical services under the Act-let alone "a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record supporting the findings" required
by Idaho Code section 67-5248(1)(a). As such, because the Board failed to provide sufficient
findings of fact and conclusions of law that provide specificity as to why the dates of service
from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were denied, the Board's decision failed to comply
with the APA and should be reversed. See App. Op. Br. at 32-35.
D.

St. Luke's Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced.

The County does not respond or otherwise argue that St. Luke's substantial rights have
not been prejudiced.

Thus, for the reasons outlined in its opening brief, see App. Op. Br.

at 35-36, St. Luke's respectfully requests that the Court hold that its substantial rights have been
prejudiced.
IV.

CONCLUSION
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The County has not responded to or otherwise rebutted St. Luke's assertion that the plain
language of Idaho Code section 31-3502(1 S)A( e) requires the Board to consider the actual
availability of services at a facility willing to provide those services in determining whether the
services rendered "are the most cost-effective" services. Instead, the County has attempted to
side-step the fact that there were no lower cost facilities willing to accept transfer of the Patient
by attempting to paint St. Luke's as a bad actor with unfounded factual assertions, by attempting
to shift responsibility for determining the legal meaning of necessary medical services to
Dr. Dammrose, and by arguing that requiring availability would erase the statutory limitations on
compensation for medical services rendered to an indigent patient.
However, as discussed above, there is no factual support for the County's assertion that
St. Luke's acted improperly. Further, there is no legal support for the County's assertions that
St. Luke's, rather than the County, is financially responsible for contracting for indigent patients'
care. Nor is their any credible support for the County's argument that the Board is bound by
Dr. Dammrose' s legal opinions, or that requiring actual availability would erase the statutory
limitations placed on compensation for medical services. For these reasons, and those detailed in
its Opening Brief, St. Luke's respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Board's decision
and award attorney fees to St. Luke's.
DATED THIS 23 rd day of September, 2020.
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